The EU and Serbia finalised a controversial lithium mining agreement essential for electric vehicle batteries. Amidst Serbia’s alignment with Russia and internal democratic backsliding, this deal raises significant concerns. It underscores the EU’s urgent need for strategic resources and the complex dynamics of appeasement for ‘stability’ to prevent further alignment of Serbia with Russia and China. These events are crucial for understanding the future of EU-Serbia relations and the implications for the region as a whole.
The relations between Serbia and the West these past few years have been quite complicated and reached their lowest point, especially with the war in Ukraine. Serbia has consistently refrained from imposing sanctions on Russia since the onset of the Ukrainian conflict. Subsequently, Russia and Serbia agreed to synchronise their foreign policies and maintain ongoing consultations on international affairs, even as Serbia remains an EU candidate state.
According to the EU, Serbia’s elections in early 2024 were deemed unfair and marred by irregularities. Following these elections, a new government with many pro-Russian and sanctioned figures was appointed. Shortly after, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić sent a congratulatory letter to Vladimir Putin for his reelection in March. Within Serbia, there have been accusations by high officials that Germany is attempting to incite a “second Maidan” whenever there are opposition protests or public dissatisfaction.
During this period, Vučić has been cautious, attempting to maintain the façade of “balancing” and “non-alignment.” He has also strengthened ties with China, highlighted by Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia during his European tour. Meanwhile, relations with Kosovo have deteriorated, with rising tensions and a stalled dialogue, leaving the prospect of future progress uncertain. Vučić has been enjoying this dance at three weddings, which has helped him maintain his image and power inside Serbia. He portrays himself as the only promising leader, benefiting from “eating with three spoons” while occasionally reminding the West that the future of Serbia is European.
It is this atmosphere that forced Germany’s Scholz to act fast. On July 19, 2024, the European Union and Serbia formally agreed to develop a lithium mining project critical for electric vehicle batteries. The ceremony in Belgrade saw Chancellor Scholz and Vučić in attendance. Serbia recently approved the restart of the Jadar lithium mine, which is expected to produce up to 58,000 tons of lithium annually, enough for 1.1 million electric vehicles. The mine has raised local environmental concerns. Vučić promised stringent protections involving top European experts. These concerns have sparked protests from environmental activists, and opposition to the deal is expected to intensify.
A few days later, the Council of the European Union decided to grant Schengen access to Kosovo Serbs holding Serbian passports. These passports are deemed illegal by Kosovo institutions as they unfairly classify Kosovo Serbs as Serbian citizens and cities within Kosovo as part of Serbia. This decision by the Council undermines Kosovo’s genuine efforts to integrate these citizens into its institutions, exacerbating ethnic divisions and tensions and undermining Kosovo’s constitution and rule of law.
This kind of appeasement from the EU enables Vučić to tighten his grip on power and perpetuate his aggressive stance in the region. It tarnishes the EU’s reputation, once seen as a champion of change and progress for the region, now perceived as supporting stagnation, regression, and maintaining the status quo. The lithium deal was a desperate move to prevent China and Russia from securing a similar agreement with Serbia. This outcome directly results from Vučić’s “balancing” strategy, where he gradually aligns with one power to intimidate the other until the latter returns in desperation to negotiate.This strategy allows Vučić to avoid consequences for his actions (such as the Banjska attack and his controversial dealings with Russia) while reaping rewards without merit. It highlights the EU’s lack of willingness to drive change in the region, reinforcing a cycle of “boosting stabilitocracy.” Stabilitocracy, where stability is prioritised over genuine democratic reform, aligns with Vučić’s tactics of maintaining power through manipulation rather than progress. This approach undermines meaningful reform in the region, perpetuating uncertainty about its future and European integration in favour of superficial stability. It empowers autocrats like Vučić, who make empty promises of reform and stability but consolidate their power by fostering instability. This instability enables them to maintain their positions and leverage their power to blackmail the EU, which is preoccupied with more pressing issues. Ultimately, this demonstrates that the region’s “waiting line” is far longer and more complex than initially seemed.